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EDITORIAL

WAR BETWEEN RELIGIONS
The Cold War Between Religions

It is ironic as well as tragic that after the liberation from decades of persecution under
Communism that affected all churches, that the new freedom be misused for escalation of
tensions and conflict between many of the churches. The reasons are many:
1.

Ecumenism under the Communist control was monitored and manipulated by the

government. In many instances ecumenism did not go beyond pleasantries and protocol. Few
genuine theological and institutional interfaith dialogues were possible. Councils of churches
and church mergers were brought about by government decrees.
dissolved because of political reasons.

Entire churches were

Hierarchical authoritarianism was promoted by the

government in order to simplify supervision. Some churches and church leaders perceived
international ecumenical contacts as favoring those domestic church leaders who agreed to
cooperate with the government. International ecumenical leaders were often insufficiently
aware that there was a perception of being manipulated by the Soviet and Eastern European
government propaganda.

Bishop Laszlo Tokes of the Hungarian Reformed Church in

Romania criticized the World Council of Churches for its timidity (see OPREE Vol. 10, No.

5,

pp. 29-32) and so did Jakub Trojan, Dean of the Protestant Theological Faculty of Charles

University in Prague.

Others, for similar reasons feel that there is a need for distance

between the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy which was considered to be manipulated
by the Communits government and the Evangelical-Baptist Church. The new president of
the Evangelical-Baptist Church, Rev. Hrihoriy Kommendant, stated informally at a meeting
of the National Council of Churches at Stony Point, New York on February 27, 1992, that
it may take twenty years of distancing before they can re-commence ecumenical relations.
In jest, he added that if it took the American churches two hundred years before they
entered the ecumenical stage, we should understand why it will take Russians at least a
century to do so.
2. Now that the churches have freedom to decide their own course, a number of the
church leaders and members have repudiated ecumenism.

Many church leaders and lay

people raised the question of whether they wanted to continue ecumenical cooperation both
at home and abroad.

The new freedom allows the churches to regain many of their lost

properties and to rebuild their structures, some after many years of legal prohibition, which

1

brings a natural preoccupation with institutional rebuilding that leaves little time and
predisposition to deal with interfaith matters.
3. In a number of churches and religious organizations, new leaders were elected either
as replacement of deceased leaders or as a protest against collaborationist policies. The newly
elected leaders often come from among those clergy who were marginalized and persecuted
by the Communist governments. Some of them were exiled to remote villages; others spent
years in prison; many were denied the right to exercise their clerical offices.
perceived by their flock as untainted persons of integrity.
important characteristic for the new leadership.

They are

That, obviously, is the most

But there is a concomitant feature of

parochialism that emerged out of their marginalization and suffering. They neither know
the other church leaders nor do they trust them. They are more likely to harbor some of the
traditional attitudes toward other religions as rivals and threats.
4. The most serious reason for the tensions and in some instances demise of ecumenism
is the nationalist conflicts that are now dominating the scene in the states of the former
USSR and Yugoslavia and the countries of Romania and Czechoslovakia. In fact, there is no
Eastern European country which is not experiencing internal or external national conflict.
Since religious and ethnic identity are so closely related, the national conflicts simultaneously
bring about religious conflict. Religious leaders have been more able to take advantage of
the opportunity to stress such identification than to consider those who belong to another
nation or religion in a sisterly or brotherly manner.

There is a distinct lack of courage in

proclaiming that the enemy has the same God-given dignity and needs to be loved as one's
own. A Hungarian church leader admitted to the author that had he declared in his churches
that God equally cares for Romanians as for Hungarians he would he immediately lost his
credibility.

The lesson of forgiveness and caring has been lost amidst the unleashed

invectives and hatreds; "God and country" seems again to be the rampant ideology.

5.

The Ukraine has been rocked by sometimes violent clashes between the Orthodox and

Ukrainian Catholic adherents.

Questions of history, legal recognition, property, and

membership issues have reached such bitterness that it has affected Orthodox-Catholic
relationship in general and has cooled it down to its lowest level since Vatican II.

The

Orthodox leaders not only in Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia but also in Romania interpret
the lively interest of the Catholic Church in events in Eastern Europe as signs of Catholic
designs upon their territories. In Romania, the Eastern Rite church is unreconciling in its
attitude not only toward the Orthodox but also toward the Latin Rite Catholics.1 The Synod
of European Catholic Bishops of November 28-December 4, 1991, on the theme of the re
evangelization of Europe was interpreted by many Orthodox as a rally to proselytize among

1

"Starre Haltung der unierten Kirche," Glaube in der 2. Welt Vol 20, No.
ii

I (January 1992), p. 10.

2
the Orthodox.

The Russian Orthodox are particularly baffled by what seems to them an

invasion of Catholic and Protestant proselytizers who sometimes show little regard for the
local culture and historical religions.

Most of this has been done without ecumenical

consultations.

6.

Still another conflict is an inter-Orthodox controversy between the Serbian Orthodox

Church and Macedonian Orthodox Church as well as strife whether the Orthodox Church in
Montenegro should remain under the Patriarchate of Belgrade or seek an autonomous
Montenegrin Orthodox Church.

The existence of a Macedonian Orthodox Church is not

particularly welcomed either by the Bulgarian or the Greek Orthodox Church as Macedonians
harbor aspirations toward a greater Macedonian that would encompass parts of Greece and
Bulgaria while these two countries both claim Macedonia is theirs.

The Hot War Between Religions

Cold war is preferable to a shooting war. In the shortest of times, the cold war between
some religions erupted into a hot one. It is true that these are not classical religious wars
where religion is the major or one of the major causes, nevertheless religion plays and
important role in these wars.

Here ancient national feuds, territorial disputes, suppressed

national aspirations due to Communist controls, and the lack of moderating civil institutions
(e.g. no tradition of independent peace movements or pacifism) are in the foreground of the
conflicts. But religion appears to gladly play a second fiddle to exaggerated national claims
by stressing the victim role from which the religio-national unit now seeks to emerge. To
point to the most apparent ones:

I . The Armenian-Azeri war. The Armenian-Azeri clashes are ancient; they took place
twice in the twentieth century, in

1 905

and

1 9 1 8.

After brief independence of both states,

the Soviet government gained control of the territory, suppressed national clashes, and
decided that the Nagorno-Karabakh area populated by an Armenian majority is to be an
autonomous region administered by Azerbeijan.

The two nationalities lived in relative

harmony until the Great Transformation upon which bloodshed was resumed.

Its worst

outbreaks came after the two states gained complete independence and climaxed in early
March

1 992

when hundreds, if not thousands, have been killed in territorial clashes in

Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenians, who generally have the sympathy of the West as well as

significant numbers in the diaspora on account of their suffering in the

1 9 1 5/ 1 9 1 6 massacres

in Turkey, seem to have inflicted heavy damages on the Azeri population that is now

·· . .

2For a thoughtful American Roman Catholic reflection on this issue see Rembert G. Weakland,
O.S.B. [Archbishop of Milwaukee], "Crisis in Orthodox-Catholic Relations: Challenges and Hopes,"
America Vol. 1 66, No. 2 (January 1 8-25, 1 992) , pp. 30-35.
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responding with blinding furry. To quote Rustam Gadzhiev, the leader of the Popular Front
of Azerbeijan: "A week ago, I could have forgiven the Armenians. But now, after handling
the mutilated corpses of children, I cannot forgive. I consider myself a peaceful man, but
after what I have seen, I will kill Armenian children. I will kill any Armenian, no matter
what age. I could do it simply. Life has forced us to do this."3 Surely, there are those on
the Armenian side who would repeat such a statement but direct it against the Azeris. The
Muslim and Christian religious leadership of the two groups have not intervened forcefully
to mediate the conflict. More likely, they are lobbying among their co-religionists elsewhere
in the world to gain support and sympathy for the cause of their people.

2.

The conflicts in Georgia and Moldavia. Violence. although not on a massive scale has

erupted in these two states as well.

In Georgia the conflict has intra-Georgian political

dimensions, but it also has a Christian-Muslim facet as Christian Georgians fight Muslim
minorities.

In Moldavia it is the Romanians versus Ukrainians and Russians, and while

there is generally no denominational difference, the Romanian Orthodox Church gives
enthusiastic support to the annexation of the Romanian parts of Moldavia to Romania while
the Russian and Ukrainian churches oppose such aspirations.

3.

The civil war in Yugoslavia or former Yugoslavia. The main military activities are

taking place in Croatia which has declared independence on June
Slovenia).

25, 1 99 1

(along with

The major war is between the predominantly Roman Catholic Croats and

predominantly Orthodox Serbs. This is complicated by the military activities of the Yugoslav
Army which has in the meantime become for all practical purposes a Serbian Army, with the
unregulated military escapades of Serbian and Croatian irregulars (chetniks and ustashes
respectively)--space constrictions do not allow a more detailed and nuanced presentation of
the multiplicity of combatants. Some of .the combatants interpret the conflict, whether out
of conviction or out of malice, as a religious war between Roman Catholicism and Serbian
Orthodoxy. It is not surprising that religious buildings of both these churches seem to be a
particularly desirable target for the other side (The Roman Catholic Church claims
destroyed religious objects by the end of November

1 991 ;

1 20

one may assume that nearly as

many Orthodox religious buildings ended up as casualties as well). There have been a few
meetings and calls for peace and reconciliation between the leaders of the two churches, but
somehow they are general. The leaders of neither church has called the opposite side their
Christian sisters and brothers; such terms are reserved for one's own flock. Since the war has
now lasted for months there have been chances for theological reflections. Thus, Dr. Drago
,

Simundza, editor of the Catholic Crkva u svijetu [Church in the World] recognizes the right

3Fen Montaigne, "Azeri-Armenia conflict takes a deadly new turn," The Philadelphia Inquirer,
March 8, 1 992.
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of Croatian Catholics for self-defense and self-determination but urges restraint and only
4
morally defensible use of force, yet no overt call for reconciliation can be found. On the
whole, church leaders of both churches have been very busy appealing for assistance and
support from abroad, claiming that genocide is being carried out over their own membership
but showing no criticism of the behavior of their own national forces.

4.

Another major conflict on the Balkans is between Serbian Orthodox and Muslims.

This conflict is two-pronged. One is the conflict between Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo,
the Albanians being overwhelmingly Muslim with a Catholic minority, and the other is
between Serbians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Muslim who make the largest
group of the population in that republic. The Kosovo Albanians have sought autonomy or
status of a republic while a referendum in Bosnia, which was boycotted by the Serbs yielded
a majority opting for independence. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic,
threatened that such a move means the end of Islam in Yugoslavia, a not-very-veiled threat
of genocide of about

3-4 million people.

There is an attempt to somehow bring the Muslim,

Orthodox, and Catholic clergy in Bosnia together by a joint publication, Zajednistvo
[Togetherness] and a bi-annual book fair in Sarajevo at which time an inter-faith dialogue
would take place, but all of this may come to naught if the outburst of violence after the
referendum in early March

1992

is followed up by additional bloodshed.

What Can Religious People in the West Do to Help Ecumenism in the East?

Nothing can be done from the outside to determine the course of ecumenism in any
particular locale, but one can aid and support certain trends toward cooperation and dialogue.
The first and foremost would be to give an uplifting witness by our own ecumenical
cooperation and dialogue.

·

The second would be to avoid behaving in Eastern Europe as if it was a terra incognita.
Religious aid and presence in Eastern Europe should be implemented by some degree of
consultation, notification, and wherever possible cooperation. Western humanitarian aid can
provide the context in which religious people of the East may meet without constraint and
may develop new contacts that can serve in the future as training ground for the new, non
manipulated ecumenism.
The third would be for the more evangelistic religious groups, old and new religions
alike, to show respect and concern for other religions that operated in these countries for
centuries. It is true that religious leaders in the East will have to learn that religious freedom

S

4
Drago imundza, "Bezumnost osvajackog rata i borba za mir u Hrvatskoj 1 99 1 " [The lunacy of
the war of subjugation and the struggle for peace in Croatia 1 99 1 ], Crkva u Svijetu Vol. 24, No. 4
( 1 99 1 ), pp. 225-229.
v

means that, indeed, any religious group has the right to function on any territory.

True

religious freedom brings religious pluralism and especially unchurched population may be
rightfully contacted and invited, but without coercion or deceit.

Such groups should,

however, be especially thoughtful of the suffering and victimization produced by
Communism and should not exploit this situation by show of glitter, finances, and
manipulation. It would probably be desirable to organize mission consultations in the West
with participation of both ecumenical and evangelistic mission agencies and persons on how
to proceed thoughtfully to evangelize in an area where historically religion was strong but
where Communism created a vast ignorance of religion and a decline in religious practice.
The established churches in the East may well ask themselves whether people are better off
not to be reached by their own religious efforts or being converted to another religious
institution.
Fourthly, time will help.

The Great Transformation happened all too recently, and it

unavoidably brings disorientation, confusion, and even chaos. As time passes, many things
will be sorted out, and the various players will gain strength and confidence and will cease
to be as threatened by rivalries as they are now. If ecumenism and interreligious dialogue
really has something abiding to offer in the history of religions, then it will do it despite
regional set-backs.

Just as it is likely that many Eastern Europeans will catch up in

technology, they will also catch up in ecumenism, leaving behind the cold and hot religious
wars of the current scene.
Lastly, ecumenically oriented religious groups must do everything they can to stay neutral
if they wish to be reconcilers in these local turmoils. It will not do for the Vatican to only
show support and provide relief for the Catholics in Croatia and the World Couincil of
Churches only to visit the churches that are members of the WCC, namely the Serbian
Orthodox Church and some of the Protestant Churches, as they have done so far. Christians
of the West should also show concern for the well-being of Muslims and not only for fellow
Christians. The exaggerated rhetoric of the danger of Islamic fundamentalism on part some
Eastern Europeans needs to be countered by reason and moderation of Christians and
Muslims from outside the area. Both relief and contacts must be balanced if we are to be
successful peace-makers. Peace-making was a high priority for many of us during the Cold
War between the two blocs.

It should continue as a high priority in the new situation of

numerous cold and hot religious and national wars in Eastern Europe and the independent
states of the former Soviet Union.

Paul Mojzes, editor
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